We study the optimal timing of an auction in a setting where bidders arrive and depart stochastically over time. First, we compare the revenue-maximizing timing and welfaremaximizing timing. We show that sellers hold auctions too late or too early whenever (censored at 0) virtual values are more or less right-skewed than values. We connect the relative rightskewness of virtual values to the "price elasticity of demand" of the bidder's valuation distribution. In particular, we show that sellers typically hold auctions inefficiently late. Second, we prove that the use of simple timing rules (i.e., a fixed deadline chosen in advance) can lose an arbitrarily large fraction of the revenue from the optimal stopping rule. This underscores the importance of taking timing seriously for good auction market design. JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D44, D47, D82, L12.
Introduction
When an auction house sells a famous painting, it holds the auction in a room on a fixed date, and all bidders have to register with the house before participating. Most literature on mechanism design with transfers models situations like these, where the designer knows the set of bidders in advance. This leaves out a crucial part of the design problem: the auctioneer is often uncertain about who will show up for the auction (and by when) and must make a strategic decision about when to hold the auction. Consider, for instance, the market for distressed corporate assets. After the firm decides to restructure and sell a division, it cannot take for granted that there will be a given set of bidders. Interested bidders for these assets are hard to find, and even when found, it takes considerable time and effort to motivate them to bid. The process usually involves both hiring an investment bank at significant cost and several months' delay (Boone and Mulherin [2009] note that the process takes more than six months on average, a very long time for a company in distress). Like the auction house selling a painting, the firm selling a division must decide how to allocate the object and determine prices. But the firm also faces a new set of problems. It must choose not only how to run the auction, but also how long to search for bidders. If the firm does not wait long enough, it may end up with too few bidders and raise little revenue, since the bidders will face less competitive pressure to bid aggressively. On the other hand, by waiting too long in the hopes of receiving more (or better) bidders, it risks that promising current bidders may find other opportunities and leave. Likewise, the things we should worry about as analysts changes. In the painting example, the main efficiency concern was whether the painting went to the highest value bidder. Now we need to ask, how long will it take for the bidder to get the division and the firm to get the money? Will the selling firm, who cares about its own time and its profit but not about bidders' time, hold the auction later than would a social planner who wanted to maximize total surplus? We need to consider not only incentives to bid truthfully, but incentives to "arrive truthfully": bidders could, say, delay making offers until they see other bidders enter, in the hopes that the firm will become more desperate to sell and hold an auction with more favorable terms.
Motivated by this example, we study the problem of when to hold an auction in an environment where bidders arrive and depart stochastically over time.
Right-skewness and Comparative Statics in the Distribution of Bidder Values
First, we ask what changes in the distribution of bidder values cause the social planner to delay the auction. We're especially interested in comparative statics on auction timing that are robust to the particular way in which bidders arrive and depart. We show that the key condition that determines the relative efficient timing of an auction is how right-skewed the valuation distribution is, in a sense we define precisely below. If a distribution of types F is more right-skewed than a distribution H, we prove that the social planner holds an auction later under F regardless of how bidders arrive, so long as they never depart, and their arrival times are uninformative about their value for the good being auctioned. With a very right-skewed valuation distribution, new draws will exceed the sample maximum more often and by large margins, since they will tend to come from a longer right tail. Adding new bidders will grow total surplus quickly under such a distribution, which gives the social planner strong incentive to wait.
Of course, this intuition breaks down when bidders both arrive and depart, since a distribution of types where surplus grows very quickly with new arrivals is also one where surplus shrinks very quickly with departures. Nonetheless, we are able to establish a reasonably general comparative statics result for the case with departures: if a distribution of types F is more right-skewed than a distribution H, we prove that the social planner stops later under F so long as inter-arrival times are iid with increasing hazard rates, and sojourn times are iid exponential random variables. Inefficiencies imposed by profit-maximization Following Myerson (1981) , profit-maximizers act like social planners who maximize expected discounted virtual values (as opposed to true values), so our comparative statics results lead to a related question: how do a monopolist seller and the social planner differ in their choice of auction timing? Consider again the corporate takeover example. An initial intuition might suggest that the firm (which maximizes discounted profits) would always hold the auction inefficiently late: once the firm finds a bidder who really values its assets, additional bidders add very little social value (since only one of them will win the auction anyway), but they may add quite a lot of revenue by putting competitive pressure on existing bidders to raise their offers.
We show that this reasoning is incomplete. On the one hand, we show that a seller may hold the auction too early or too late depending on the distribution of bidder valuations, since censored values net of information rents (i.e., the seller's payoffs) may be more or less right-skewed than true valuations. In particular, the direction of inefficiency will depend on the valuation distribution's elasticity with respect to price. On the other hand, we identify two distinct effects-an information rent effect and auction format effect-that cause a revenue-maximizing seller's timing choices to diverge from the planner's, and we show that these effects can work in opposite directions. The following example illustrates how these two effects work.
Example 1. Consider a problem in which the auctioneer chooses when to hold an auction over a time horizon t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. One bidder arrives in each period. Thus, an auction held in period t has t bidders. The auctioneer discounts the future at a rate δ = 0.7, so at time t both revenue and surplus are discounted by δ t−1 . Bidders' valuations are drawn iid from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] . For each n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let R(n, 0) and S(n) denote the expected revenue and surplus, respectively, from a second price auction with no reserve price and n bidders. Likewise, let R(n, p * ) denote the expected revenue from a second price auction with reserve price p * = 1/2, i.e., a revenue-optimal auction. Table 1 then presents the discounted expected revenues and surplus from each possible timing choice. 1 t 1 2 3 δ t R(t, 0) 0 0.23 0.25 δ t S(t) 0.5 0.47 0.37 δ t R(t, p * ) 0.25 0.29 0.26 Table 1 : Expected Discounted Payoffs -Second Price Auction
The results in Table 1 capture three general features. First, we see that the seller who can use an optimal auction holds the auction inefficiently late (t = 2 vs t = 1, the efficient choice), since the virtual valuation censored below at zero, max {2v − 1, 0}, is more right-skewed than the actual valuation v. (The elasticity for this distribution is v(1 − v) −1 , which is increasing.) Second, the seller who is forced to use an (efficient) second price auction with no reserve price holds the auction later (t = 3) than the planner (t = 1). The seller cares about bidder values net of information rents, whereas the social planner cares only about bidder values; the two evaluate the same auction format differently, and accordingly choose different waiting times even when using the same auction format (a "pure" information rent effect). In Example 1, the information rent effect leads to a later auction. In general, the information rent effect can make the seller hold the auction inefficiently early or inefficiently late, depending on the distribution of types.
Third, the seller who uses an optimal auction (i.e., chooses an optimal reserve price) in Example 1 holds the auction at t = 2, earlier than the seller who is forced to use an efficient (zero reserve price) auction. Once the seller stops and holds the auction, she wants to use an optimal auction, which is typically different form the efficient auction chosen by the social planner. This choice of auction format feeds back into the decision of when to hold the auction (an auction format effect). Below, we establish that the auction format effect always leads to earlier auctions.
Third, we see in the example that the information rent effect pushes the seller's timing later than the planner by two periods (given the efficient auction), while the auction format effect pushes the seller's timing earlier by one period. Hence, the information rent effect dominates, so that the net effect of revenue maximization is to push the auction later. We show this holds generally, so whether the seller holds the auction too soon or too late depends on the sign of the information rent effect. Fixed-in-advance Deadlines and Approximate Optimality The second question we study is whether the simpler stopping rules used in practice can be "approximately" as good as the optimal policy for a broad range of environments (see, for instance, (2v − 1)tv t−1 dv. Hartline and Hartline, 2012) . For instance, auctioneers often commit in advance to a fixed date at which to hold the auction (e.g., real estate auctions are commonly run in this fashion). This degenerate stopping time is simpler than changing the date as a function of the arrival and departure of bidders, so it is possible that real-world sellers perceive that fixed dates perform "well enough" across a variety of possible market conditions and are easier to implement. To investigate this possibility, we verify whether fixed-in-advance deadlines can provide an "α-approximation" (Hartline, 2012) to the auction timing problem: that is, do fixed deadlines always achieve at least a share α of the fully optimal expected discounted revenue, regardless of the distribution of values or arrivals? Seen another way, what is the gain to the seller from being able to respond to the history bidder arrivals? Surprisingly, we show that simplicity is no guarantee of robustness here, and even deadlines that are chosen optimally in advance with full knowledge of the environment can perform arbitrarily poorly in the worst case. This suggests that the gain from having access the history of bidder arrivals can be very large unless the seller believes there are restrictions on the primitives of the problem. We also show a preliminary result that, under a strong condition on the arrival time distribution, optimal deadlines do guarantee at least 1/e of the best case payoff.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the environment and formally sets up the auction timing problem. Section 4 introduces the notion of right-skewness of a valuation distribution. Focusing on the case with no departures, this section establishes several comparative statics using that notion, and it studies the inefficiencies that arise from profit-maximization. Section 5 extends these results to the case when bidders depart stochastically. Section 6 proves that using deterministic timing rules (i.e., deadlines) can perform arbitrarily worse than the fully optimal timing, and Section 7 concludes. All omitted proofs are relegated to the Appendices.
Related Literature
Wang (1993) appears to be the first paper to study the timing of an auction as a seller's strategic choice. He analyzes a model in which the seller has one unit of an object to sell to buyers who arrive according to a homogenous Poisson process. She 2 can decide to sell the object either by posting a price or by holding an auction at a fixed deadline chosen in advance, and she bears a constant flow cost from holding the inventory. Wang shows that, in this setting, the seller's timing can be different from the socially optimal one. In contrast, we consider significantly more general arrival and departure dynamics, and we allow the seller much more leeway in choosing when to hold the auction. In particular, she can use any stopping time that is adapted to the history of arrivals and departures. The recent paper by Cong (2015) also studies an auction timing problem, but in a very different context (the selling of real options to long-lived bidders). Among other things, he finds that the seller inefficiently delays the auction.
The present paper also relates to a more recent literature on bidder solicitation. Szech (2011) and Fang and Li (2015) study a static environment in which an auctioneer must use costly advertising to attract bidders. In contrast to Wang (1993) , Szech (2011), or Fang and Li (2015) , the solicitation cost in our paper comes from time discounting. This requires a very different set of arguments and makes the comparison between the seller and planner harder: unlike advertising or linear (flow) waiting costs, costs from time discounting are evaluated differently by the seller and the planner.
In Remark 4, we give a detailed discussion of the findings in this literature, and how they relate to ours.
Another strand of related literature is the dynamic mechanism design problem of allocating objects to stochastically arriving agents (Gallien, 2006; Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Strack, 2014; Board and Skrzypacz, Forthcoming) . These papers derive a fully optimal dynamic mechanism for a more restricted class of agents' arrival processes, and they focus especially on when these mechanisms can be implemented in posted prices. In contrast to these papers, we focus on the timing of the transaction, and thus we use more general arrival and departure dynamics, but with a restricted class of mechanisms. One notable contribution, relative to this literature, is that we can give full solutions for the case with stochastically departing agents, which is not very much studied except in the literature on dynamic matching market design (e.g., Akbarpour et al. (2016) ). Loertscher et al. (2016) consider a similar model to ours, where traders arrive stochastically and the market maker trades off the gains of market thickness against the costs of delay, but where agents' valuations lie in a finite type space. This restriction on the size of the seller's state space lets them consider more intricate market making algorithms that condition trading ("stopping" in our language) on the particular type realizations. Compared to their paper, we have a richer type space, we give general comparative statics results that apply uniformly for any arrival process, and we consider the worst-case robustness of simple rules.
The optimal timing of an auction derived in Section 5 has some similarity to the search literature on the optimality of reservation wage policies, as in Zuckerman (1984 Zuckerman ( , 1986 Zuckerman ( , 1988 . He shows that, in a continuous time job search problem, the reservation wage policy is optimal under general renewal processes satisfying New-Better-than-Used (NBU) property. In our model, a similar logic derives the optimal timing characterized by the cutoff number of bidders, assuming that the renewal process has the inter-arrival time with the increasing hazard rate, a slightly stronger condition than NBU.
Setting
A designer allocates one indivisible good to randomly arriving potential bidders over a time horizon [0, ∞). The bidders arrive and depart according to a time-inhomogeneous counting process {N (t), t ≥ 0}, where N (t) is a random variable representing the number of bidders at time t. As it will become clear, we do not need to record the identity of each bidder upon describing the arrival and departure dynamics, because the bidders' valuations are drawn from the same distribution. We say that there are no departures if N (·) is path-wise increasing, which will be our main focus in Section 4. 3 A bidder i is characterized by an arrival time a i and a value v i for the good. Each v i is i's private information, and the v i 's are drawn iid according to a continuous distribution F independently from N (·). Throughout the paper, we assume that (i) F has a finite expectation, (ii) F has a positive density f , (iii) F (0) = 0, and (iv) F is regular, i.e., v −
1−F (v)
f (v) is increasing. 4 We can interpret a i as the time at which i first has demand for (or is able to receive) the good, or as the time i first notices that an auction is taking place. For ease of exposition, we mostly treat a i as though it is publicly observed, but later we explain how our results extend to the case where bidder i strategically delays his arrival, i.e., can report anyâ i ≥ a i . 5 We do not impose specific assumptions about the timing at which a bidder learns his own valuation v. Our results hold as long as the bidder knows the realization of v when he makes a bid in the auction.
We assume that the designer can commit to any mechanism, so by a version of the Revelation Principle we can restrict ourselves to studying truthful direct mechanisms. 6 However, we do not consider the full set of possible direct mechanisms; we restrict the analysis to mechanisms of the following form:
1. a timing policy, i.e., a stopping time τ at which to hold an auction, adapted only to the history of arrival and departure times.
2. an auction format to be used upon stopping, i.e., a static direct mechanism consisting of allocations x and transfers p for bidders in the market at τ . This mechanism can be adapted to the entire history observed by the designer.
The economic content of these restrictions is that we rule out any kind of indicative bidding before the actual auction takes place (so the seller cannot, as is often done in corporate takeover auctions, ask for non-binding initial offers from prospective bidders before the final, binding bids are due). We impose this restriction for three reasons: (i) unlike the previous literature on mechanism design with dynamic populations, it lets us focus cleanly on the question of timing; (ii) it lets us explicitly solve for an optimal policy in an environment where bidders not only arrive but also depart stochastically; and (iii) it lets us consider a much broader range of arrival and departure processes than has previously been done in the literature on optimal dynamic mechanism design with arriving bidders. However, the restriction is not without loss of generality. For instance, the fully optimal mechanism will probably not lie in this class. Consider a designer who uses an auction with a binding reserve price. At a minimum, the designer would want to know before stopping at some history of arrivals h t whether any of the bidders in the pool could even meet the reserve price; otherwise the good would go unsold, and it would have been better to check that arriving bidders were willing to submit serious offers. 7 Preferences are as follows. If a bidder of value v gets the object and pays p in an auction held at time t, his payoff is given by e −rt (v − p) where r > 0 is the discount factor. Meanwhile, if the designer's objective is to maximize revenue as a seller, she would receive a payoff of e −rt p, the discounted revenue. If the objective is to maximize the welfare as a social planner, she would receive discounted surplus e −rt v.
Given the full commitment assumption and our restriction on the class of mechanisms, we can pin down the auction formats that would be used by the seller and the planner under these preferences. Fix any stopping time τ and a selling mechanism (x, p). Then, the seller's expected profit weakly increases if she stops according to τ but instead of using (x, p), she sells the good using an optimal static direct mechanism for the pool of bidders that are present at τ . Therefore, if F is regular, by the Payoff Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981) , we can assume without loss of generality that, upon stopping, the seller uses a second price auction with an optimal reserve price
1−F (p) denotes F 's hazard rate. 8 Repeating the same reasoning for the planner, we can assume that she will use a second price auction with no reserve price.
Let R(n, p) denote the expected revenue from a second price auction with reserve price p, and S(n) denote the expected surplus from a second price auction with no reserve price. Below, we write R(n) as short-hand for R(n, p * ) whenever it does not cause confusion. Also, we denote the virtual valuation v −1/λ(v) by M R(v). Then, by the discussion above, the seller chooses a stopping time τ adapted to the history of arrivals and departures so as to maximize
whereas the planner chooses τ to maximize
where the equalities follow from conditional expectations and the Strong Markov Property. In other words, the auction timing problem for both the seller and the social planner reduce to optimal stopping problems with no flow cost and payoffs upon stopping of R(n, p * ) and S(n), respectively. Below we will make repeated use of the following key facts regarding payoffs upon stopping.
1. non-negative and increasing in n.
3. their one-step ratios are decreasing, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix E.
Fact 1 captures the intuitive fact that additional bidders become less valuable the more bidders are already in the market.
Right-Skewness and Comparative Statics
Definition 1 (Right-skewness). For two random variables X and Y , call Y be more (less) rightskewed if there are positive, increasing functions g and h and a third random variable Z such that
To understand why the above condition captures higher right-skewness, note that, whenever h/g is increasing, h(Z) pushes large draws of Z farther out into its right tail (relative to small draws) than g(Z) does, and h(Z) also shrinks small draws of Z towards the left tail more than g(Z) does. This comparison is scale-invariant, so Y being more right-skewed than X is distinct from Y having a fatter or longer right tail than X, which might be false depending on the relative scales of X and Y . 9 In the statistics literature, our right-skewness comparison corresponds to h(Z) 8 This reasoning continues to be true by setting p * = −∞ if p − 1/λ(p) ≥ 0 for all p. 9 So read this comparison as "relatively more of X's mass is on the right of its support," as opposed to "X has more mass on the right than Y does". being larger than g(Z) in the star-shaped order. 10 Throughout, we use "more right-skewed" rather than "larger in the star-shaped order" in order to emphasize the underlying intuition.
Remark 1. We can extend both the notion of "more right-skewed" and the conclusions of Lemma 1 to cases where h and g can be zero (possibly simultaneously, so that h/g is not defined). All the arguments below continue to hold so long as h(z) − cg(z) crosses zero only once and from below for any c > 0. (This is equivalent to h/g being increasing if g > 0 everywhere).
Moreover, the conclusions of Lemma 1 hold even if h (but not g) can be negative. The interpretation of increasing h/g as "more right-skewed" becomes problematic in that case, though, since h pushes low draws of Z far into the left tail, whereas g shrinks them towards zero.
The following lemma, which connects right-skewness comparisons to growth rates of expected highest draws, drives all of our comparative statics on auction timing: Lemma 1. Let S A (n − k; n) and S B (n − k; n), k ∈ Z + , denote the expected k + 1-th highest draws from n iid samples drawn according to the law of random variables X A i and X B i , respectively. If
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is easiest to see for k = 0. If the distribution of bidder values is left-skewed in the star-shaped sense, then adding more bidders (i.e., more draws from the distribution) will grow total surplus (i.e., the sample maximum) slowly: most of the time, a new draw will not exceed the current sample maximum, and when it does exceed the current maximum, it will usually only do so by a little. In contrast, with a very right-skewed valuation distribution, new bidders will grow total surplus quickly, since new draws from the distribution will exceed the sample maximum more often and by large margins, since they will tend to come from a longer right tail. This reasoning works realization by realization, but Lemma 1 ensures that this pointwise intuition reasoning carries over rigorously to expected highest draws.
For convenience, write S m (n) as shorthand for S m (n; n) for m = A, B. Using Lemma 1, we can provide unambiguous comparative statics for any two distributions of bidder types that are ordered by their right-skewness.
Lemma 2. Assume that there are no departures and {N (t), t ≥ 0} is independent of bidder valuations. Consider two social planners A and B facing bidder valuations X A i and X B i , respectively, where X A i is more right-skewed than X B i . Then, social planner A holds the auction later than B.
Proof. By Lemma 1, since A facing a more right-skewed distribution implies that
Therefore, we have the following inequality:
We now show that, if A stops after a finite history h t , B also stops after h t . Take any finite history h t at which the pool size is n. A stops at h t only if
for any stopping time τ . In particular, this inequality must hold for τ = τ B , B's optimal stopping time. Now, this implies that
where the second inequality is implied by (2). Then, we obtain
Note that no departures implies N (τ B ) ≥ n after h t , which enables us to use the inequality (2).
These two lemmas deliver our main result:
Theorem 1. Assume that there are no departures and {N (t), t ≥ 0} is independent of bidder valuations. Then, the seller holds the auction inefficiently late if
Conversely, the seller holds the auction inefficiently early if λ(v)v is decreasing, in which case v is more right-skewed than M R(v) ∨ 0.
Proof. Under an optimal auction, the seller has the same expected payoffs as a social planner facing a valuation distribution X i ≡ M R(v i ) ∨ 0. By Lemma 2, it therefore suffices to check whether X i is more or less right-skewed than v i in the sense of Definition 1. Indeed, since
, 0 , X i will be more (less) right-skewed than v i whenever λ(v)v is increasing (decreasing).
The statement of Theorem 1 might make it seem that inefficiently early and inefficiently late auctions are equally plausible. On closer inspection, however, the result suggests that sellers usually hold auctions inefficiently late. Indeed, a broad range of distributions have increasing λ(v)v. For instance, it suffices for F to have an increasing hazard rate. In contrast, decreasing λ(v)v should be relatively uncommon in applications. To see why, note that F has a constant λ(v)v if and only if it is a Pareto distribution (Lariviere, 2006) . Thus, for F to have a decreasing λ(v)v, it must have fatter right tails than the Pareto distribution, which itself usually models processes with very fail tails. 11 Nevertheless, the latter part of Theorem 1 is not vacuous, in the sense that there do exist regular distributions with decreasing λ(v)v and sufficiently many finite moments. For instance, take
is decreasing. Moreover, by Theorem 6.2 of Barlow et al. (1963) , lim v→+∞ λ(v)v = 2 > 1 implies that F has a finite first moment, so all the relevant expectations are well-defined. By Theorem 1, a seller facing valuation distribution F holds the auction inefficiently early. Therefore, our results suggest that the seller typically has an excessive incentive to wait for bidders compared to the planner, unless the distribution of types has extremely thick right tails.
Lemmas 1 and 2 also illuminate how a seller's optimal auction timing responds to changes in the valuation distribution. Proposition 1. Consider two regular type distributions v F ∼ F and v H ∼ H.
1. Suppose that the seller is forced to use an efficient auction, and that F is more right-skewed than H. Then, the seller facing F holds the auction later than the seller facing H.
2. Suppose that the seller is free to choose any auction format. Then, the seller facing F holds the auction later than the seller facing
The proof of the first point is almost identical to that of Lemma 2, except that it relies on the fact that expected revenue is the expected second highest value and uses Lemma 1 with k = 1 as opposed to k = 0. The proof of the second point relies on a technical extension of Lemma 1 to the case where both h and g can be zero simultaneously (so h/g can be undefined), but the intuition is the same as in Lemma 2: under the above conditions,
, so the proportional boost to revenue from adding new bidders by waiting is greater under distribution F . Thinking about right-skewness also illuminates why the condition p *
F , the former may be more right-skewed, even though M R F (·) pushes large draws of values farther into its right tail than M R H (·).
Decomposition of Welfare Effects
Theorem 1 shows that the auction timing chosen by a profit-seeking seller is typically inefficient. In this subsection, we show that this net welfare loss is a composite of the two effects:
Information Rent Effect While the planner cares about bidder values, the seller cares about values net of information rents that accrue to bidders. Therefore, even if both designers use the same efficient auction, they will face different terminal payoffs, so they will want to hold the auction at different times.
Auction Format Effect
The planner uses an efficient auction upon stopping, which differs from the revenue-optimal auction that the seller chooses upon stopping. This endogenous choice of auction formats creates another wedge between the timing choices of the seller and the planner.
The following result summarizes how these effects influence the timing of an auction. In particular, we show that the information rent effect always dominates, in the sense that the net effect always goes in the same direction as the information rent effect.
Proposition 2. Assume that there are no departures and {N (t), t ≥ 0} is independent of bidder valuations. Suppose that λ(v)v is increasing. Then,
• The seller holds the auction later than the planner when both of them use an efficient auction (a second price auction with zero reserve price).
• The seller who uses an optimal auction stops earlier than the seller who uses the efficient auction.
Suppose that λ(v)v is decreasing. Then,
• The seller holds an auction earlier than the planner when both of them use the efficient auction.
• The optimal reserve price is zero, and thus there is no auction format effect.
Without a reserve price, a new bidder contributes to revenue whenever his marginal revenue is higher than the highest marginal revenue among the existing bidders, and it increases revenue by the difference between these two marginal revenues. However, under the optimal reserve price, the new bidder adds to revenue if he has the highest marginal revenue and that marginal revenue exceeds zero. Moreover, this new bidder only increases revenue by the difference between his marginal revenue and the maximum of the other bidders' marginal revenues and 0. Thus, a positive reserve price shrinks the set of events on which a new bidder contributes to the revenue, and shrinks the amount by which revenue grows when it does; both forces makes the waiting for an additional bidder less valuable.
To understand why the auction format effect is absent for decreasing λ(v)v, it is helpful to interpret the auction as a monopoly pricing problem as in Bulow and Roberts (1989) . As we discuss in detail in Remark 3, λ(p)p corresponds to the price elasticity of demand with the demand function D(p) = 1 − F (p), and the virtual valuation p −
1−F (p)
f (p) corresponds to the marginal revenue (with respect to quantity) in a certain monopolist problem. Now, if the price elasticity of demand λ(p)p is decreasing in price p, then price becomes less and less sensitive to quantity as quantity rises. Thus, if marginal revenue is positive at some q = D(p), then it is positive for any q > q, and a monopolist with this demand curve will make a socially efficient choice of quantity, which corresponds to no reserve price in our model.
Proposition 2 also has a somewhat counterintuitive implication for policies that try to restore efficiency:
Remark 2. Proposition 2 implies that, if the timing of an auction is endogenous, forcing the seller to use the efficient auction can be welfare decreasing. Indeed, if λ(v)v is increasing, then, by Theorem 1, an unconstrained seller delays the auction excessively. However, by Proposition 2, a seller who is forced to use a zero reserve price delays the auction even more than if she were allowed to choose her preferred (inefficiently high) reserve price. Thus, if the discounting cost is significant, then simply prohibiting the use of inefficient auction formats can lower expected discounted welfare.
Remark 3 (Monotone Elasticity of Demand: A Price-Discrimination Explanation). To further illuminate the role of a monotone price elasticity in auction timing, we use Bulow and Roberts (1989) 's monopoly pricing interpretation of optimal auctions. Bulow and Roberts show that the optimal auction design problem with n bidders, each with valuation distribution F i , is formally equivalent to the third-degree price-discrimination problem of a monopolist catering n markets with demand curves q i = 1 − F i (p i ), and a maximum capacity of 1. Continuing their analogy, we can relate the seller's inefficient incentives to wait for bidders in the optimal auction timing problem to the monopolist's inefficient incentives to open new markets in the price discrimination problem, as follows.
We introduce some convenient notation. Let P (q) ≡ F −1 (1 − q) be the inverse demand curve. Note that marginal revenue as a function of quantity, d dq (qP (q)), denoted byM R(q), is equal to M R(P (q)), the virtual valuation evaluated at P (q). Also, denote the price elasticity of demand, d log q d log p , by η(p). A simple calculation shows that η(p) = λ(p)p. The price elasticity of demand evaluated at P (q), η(P (q)), is denoted byη(q). Finally, recall the relationship between marginal revenue and demand elasticity from classical price theory,M R(q) = P (q) 1 − 1 η(q) . Suppose that both the planner and the seller are currently offering a share Q < 1 of their total capacity to one market. For clarity, we focus on Q such thatM R(Q) > 0. Now, introduce a "market creation" technology: both the planner and the seller can open a new market into which they can shift capacity from the current market, but in the process they lose a share 1 − β of those resources. (This is analogous to the way in which waiting for bidders in the auction timing problem incurs a multiplicative cost from time discounting).
Consider the incentives of the planner and the seller to reallocate a small amount of capacity dq from the current market to a new, previously uncatered market. We illustrate this thought experiment in Figure 1 . The diagram on the left shows the original market, and the one on the right is the new, initially uncatered market. The blue areas show gain and losses from shifting capacity for the seller, while the sums of the blue and red areas show gains and losses for the planner. Re-writingM R(q) as P (q) 1 − Take first the case where price elasticity of demand η(v) is increasing, soη(q) is decreasing. We claim that, whenever the planner wants to move the dq units of capacity, the seller also wants to move that capacity, i.e., the seller has excessive incentives to open new markets. Indeed, if the planner wants to move the dq units, P (Q) ≤ βP (0). This, together withη(q) decreasing, implies that
so the seller wants to shift capacity into the new market. The same argument shows that, whenever η(q) is increasing (price elasticity is decreasing), if the planner does not want to shift the dq consumers, neither does the seller. In other words, the seller has insufficient incentives to create new markets.
It remains to clarify why looking at Q's withM R(Q) > 0 is sufficient. WheneverM R(Q) ≤ 0, the seller would always benefit from shifting some consumer mass to a new market, whereas the planner may not, i.e., the seller has excessive incentives to open new markets. One might therefore worry that this contradicts the reasoning given in the decreasing η(v) case. However, as shown below in the proof of Proposition 2, for regular F with decreasing η(v), M R(·) is always above 0. Thus, for regular F ,M R(Q) ≤ 0 is only ever relevant when η(v) is increasing, in which case the fact that the seller faces excessive incentives to open new markets agrees with our discussion in thẽ M R(Q) > 0 case.
Remark 4. It is interesting to compare our results with those of bidder solicitation models, such as Szech (2011) and Fang and Li (2015) . These papers study static models where the auctioneer can choose the number of bidders to have in the auction. They assume that both the planner and the seller face an additive cost to solicit bidders that is increasing and weakly convex either in the number of bidders (Szech, 2011) or in the probability of a given bidder's attendance (Fang and Li, 2015) . Similarly to ours, the auctioneer in these models decide how many bidders to have in the auction, comparing the cost of having one more bidder and his contribution to the revenue.
The main difference between our paper and this previous literature is that in our model not only do the seller and the planner face different marginal benefits from "soliciting" bidders, but they also incur different marginal costs. This follows from the fact that solicitation costs in our model are multiplicative. For example, suppose that bidders arrive according to a Poisson process with the constant rate of 1. Then, the planner's cost from delaying the auction by dt is rS(n)dt, whereas the seller's cost is rR(n)dt. This is in contrast to their papers where the seller and the planner face identical costs at the margin.
Szech (2011) and Fang and Li (2015) sign what we call the pure information rent effect: they show that, when the seller is forced to use an efficient auction format, she over-(under-) advertises relative to the planner whenever λ is increasing (decreasing). The intuition for this result follows from the expression for consumer surplus in an efficient auction, CS(n) = E[1/λ(v (n) )], where v (n) denotes the highest draw out of n samples from F . Since the seller and the planner both face the same additive costs, and S(n) = R(n, 0) + CS(n), CS(n) − CS(n − 1) is exactly the wedge between the seller's and the planner's net incentives to add a bidder, starting from a pool size of n − 1. Hence, monotone λ fully determines whether the seller solicits the bidders more or less than the planner in these models, since it characterizes whether consumer surplus is increasing or decreasing in n.
However, these papers do not fully sign the net effect. They show that, when the seller can both solicit bidders and design the auction optimally, she always under-advertises if the hazard rate λ is decreasing (arguably the less common case), but the seller may over-or under-advertise for increasing λ. Therefore, unlike our right-skewness/monotone elasticity condition, the monotone hazard rate condition does not entirely characterize solicitation decisions, which in turn makes it harder to interpret the economics of monotone λ's. In particular, why does the above intuition about marginal consumer surplus fail once the seller adds a reserve price? 12 In contrast, in our model, the same condition allows us to compare timing/solicitation choices both net and gross of auction format choices, which makes clear the economic interpretation of that condition.
Remark 5. To implement the optimal policy, the seller does not need to have as much commitment power as we assumed. As long as she can commit to sell the object through a one-shot static mechanism once she stops, the seller can implement the optimal policy without any additional commitment power for the timing rule. 13 This follows from standard dynamic programming arguments. The ability to commit to a static mechanism lets the seller implement the optimal static mechanism once she stops, which in turn pins down the expected payoffs from stopping at N (t) = n (they must equal R(n)). Therefore, the seller faces a reduced-form optimal stopping problem, and the solution to that problem must be time-consistent by dynamic programming reasoning. So even if she lacks the ability to commit to a timing policy at the outset, the seller would have the right incentives to carry out the optimal stopping rule.
Departures
In this section, we extend the main result to the case where existing bidders can also leave the market. For instance, a after arriving may leave if he finds an outside option better than taking part in the auction.
In general, when bidders can depart, the seller might stop earlier than the planner even if
Recall that Theorem 1 in the previous section depends on the fact that, when
v is increasing, the seller gains proportionally more than the planner from having an additional bidder. However, if a bidder can depart, this large gain from one more bidder necessarily implies a large loss from having one fewer bidder. Depending the arrival-departure dynamics, the latter effect can dominate the former, so the seller may choose to hold the auction earlier than the planner. We illustrate this possibility in the following example.
Example 2. Suppose that there are two periods t ∈ {1, 2}, v i is uniformly distributed on [1, 2], and there is no discounting. Also, suppose that both the planner and the seller use a second price auction with no reserve price. (Note that F here is not only regular but has strictly increasing λ(v)v, which would guarantee a later auction by the seller in the pure arrivals case). Denoting the number of bidders at time t by N (t), define the following arrival and departure process: N (1) = 2, P(N (2) = 1) = 0.05, P(N (2) = 2) = 0.7, and P(N (2) = 3) = 0.25. Under this parametrization, we can compute that, approximately, R(N (1)) = 1.333, E[R(N (2))] = 1.308, S(N (1)) = 1.667, and E[S(N (2))] = 1.679. Therefore, the planner waits until t = 2, while the seller strictly prefers to hold the auction at t = 1. In this case, the loss from departure is large enough to deter the seller from delaying the auction, even though she has a chance to hold the auction with three bidders if she waits.
We now formally set up the auction timing problem incorporating bidders' departures. For ease of exposition, we focus on revenue maximization, but the exact same analysis applies to welfare maximization (substituting values for marginal revenues).
To avoid the problem described in Example 2, we impose some structure on the arrival-departure process N (·). First, we assume that bidders arrive according to a renewal process: the time between the arrival of the k −1-th and k-th bidders, k = 1, 2, . . . , is given by a non-negative random variable W k , where W k iid ∼ G. We assume that E[e −rW i |W i ≥ t] is well-defined and finite for any t ≥ 0. Second, we assume that each bidder can leave after a random time in the pool. We model this stochastic departure by assuming that each bidder i has a sojourn time D i in the pool, so that if i arrives at T i , he departs at calendar time T i + D i . For simplicity, we assume that sojourn times D i are drawn iid from an exponential distribution independently of the all valuations and arrival times. We assume that the D i 's are unobservable, either by the bidders or by the seller, so bidder i cannot "report" her departure time. (Later, we discuss how the optimal policy will in fact be robust to bidders' misrepresentation of their departure times). D i , for instance, could represent the sudden arrival of a better outside option for a bidder, or, in the corporate takeover example, it could model the occurrence of an unexpected negative shock to liquidity that prevents the bidder from taking part in the auction. Given the assumption that i does not know D i , our model would not fit the case where the bidder expects the negative liquidity shock in advance.
Given these assumptions on the arrivals and departures, the timing of all future arrivals is independent of the previous arrival history other than the time of the most recent arrival. 14 In particular, when D i follows an exponential distribution, then because of the memoryless property, we do not need to keep track of the time each existing bidder spent in the pool. 15 Now, let L(t) denote the time elapsed since the most recent arrival at calendar time t, so that the last arrival occurred at t − L(t). In addition, recall that the seller's expected terminal payoff from stopping with n bidders is R(n). Then, since bidder values are iid and independent of the arrivals process, the seller faces a Markov optimal stopping problem with state variable (N (t), L(t)). For future reference, let V (n, w) denote the value function at state (N (t), L(t)) = (n, w), and use the short-hand V (n) ≡ V (n, 0). Finally, let τ (n, n+1) ≡ inf {t ≥ 0 : N (t) = n + 1}− inf {t ≥ 0 : N (t) = n} denote the random time between when the pool first reaches size n and when it first reaches n + 1. (The possibility of departures makes the distribution of τ (n, n + 1) different from G).
The following result explicitly derives the optimal timing of an auction assuming that the interarrival time distribution G has an increasing hazard rate. Under this assumption, the optimal rule is characterized by the cutoff with respect to the number of bidders.
Theorem 2. Suppose that G has an increasing hazard rate (IHR) and D i is independently and identically drawn from an exponential distribution. Then starting from an empty pool at t = 0, the seller always holds the auction the first time the pool size reaches a critical threshold
In fact,
where β(n + 1) = E[e −rτ (n,n+1) ] is the (unconditional) expected discount factor between the first time the pool reaches size n and the first time it reaches size n + 1.
Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition about the role of the IHR assumption. First, whenever G has an increasing hazard rate, the seller grows more optimistic about the next arrival the longer it has been since the last arrival; accordingly, the value of continued search 14 Suppose there have been n arrivals already at time t, with the most recent one happening at t * . Then the history of arrivals excluding the most recent one is measurable with respect to W1, . . . Wn−1, whereas the timing of the next arrivals is given by Wn+1 + t * − t, Wn+1 + Wn+2 + t * − t, and so on. 15 If we consider a general distribution for Di, then the seller needs to keep track of time that each current bidder has spent in the market, because it affects her beliefs about how likely that bidder is to leave in the next dt units of time, which in turn would affect the payoffs from stopping in the next dt. In this case, the seller has a large and growing state space in her optimal stopping problem, which makes further analysis intractable. increases in waiting time (V (n, w) is increasing in w), so stopping search becomes less attractive as w grows. This implies that the seller only stops at the arrivals. In other words, the seller never holds an auction at a departure, or at a point of time where neither arrival nor departure occurred. Second, the two assumptions of renewal-process arrivals and exponential departures implies that, for each n, the evolution of N (t) after first reaching a record n is independent of all prior history (other than the fact that n was reached). This memorylessness of sorts allows us to decompose the waiting time for n bidders into independent one-step increments between successive records, which in turn allows a one-step characterization of the optimal stopping threshold.
Proof of Theorem 2. To show that in any history starting from (0, 0), the seller always stops at an arrival, note that, by Lemma 6 in Appendix C, V (n, w) is non-decreasing in w. Now, suppose to the contrary that the seller is willing to stop in between arrivals. That is, there exists a state (n, w) with w > 0, such that R(n) ≥ V (n, w). Then, since w → V (n, w) is non-decreasing, R(n) ≥ V (n, w) ≥ V (n, 0), and the seller would also want to stop at the state (n, 0). In any history starting from state (0, 0), (n, 0) is always reached before (n, w), so the seller would have stopped at (n, 0) and never reached (n, w), which is a contradiction. Therefore, if starting from (0, 0) the seller stops at all, she stops at an arrival. Accordingly, we need to check that the seller would indeed stop in finite time a.s. But this is immediate because R(1) > 0 and the payoff from never stopping is 0. Altogether, we have that the auction will happen the first time N (t) reaches an acceptable threshold, i.e., some n such that R(n) ≥ V (n, 0). Let n * denote the smallest such n.
It remains to prove that in fact n * is given by (4). The optimal stopping policy must be time consistent, so if the seller stops at n * , then n * must be the smallest maximizer of the ex ante expected discounted revenue from waiting for exactly n bidders. That is, n * must be the smallest maximizer of δ(n)R(n), where δ(n) is the expected discount factor from waiting for n bidders. If δ(n) decomposes into n i=1 β(i), then the condition that R(n) ≥ β(n + 1)R(n + 1) is simply a necessary local condition for optimization of δ(n)R(n), i.e., it implies that δ(n)R(n) ≥ δ(n + 1)R(n + 1). If we can show that indeed δ(n)R(n) is single-peaked in n, then this local condition is in fact sufficient, and we are done: inf {n ∈ N : R(n) ≥ β(n + 1)R(n + 1)} is then precisely the smallest maximizer of ex ante expected revenue. By Lemma 7 in Appendix C, our assumptions on bidder dynamics imply that the n-step discount (from waiting for n bidders) decomposes into δ(n) = n i=1 β(i). Moreover, a coupling argument (Lemma 8 in Appendix C) implies that the successive record times τ (n − 1, n) increase in the usual stochastic order as n grows, so β(n) = E[e −rτ (n−1,n) ] is decreasing. Together with Point 3 of Fact 1, we have that β(n + 1)
is single-peaked, and we conclude the proof.
The one-step characterization of n * in (4) has an especially tractable structure. The critical threshold function β(n+1) R(n+1) R(n) decouples into a term that depends only on the physical properties of the arrival-departure process (β(n + 1)), and a term that depends only on the proportional gain from having an additional bidder in the pool ( R(n+1) R(n) ). This allows us to extend the main results to the case that bidders can depart.
Theorem 3. Suppose that G has an increasing hazard rate (IHR) and D i is independently and identically drawn from an exponential distribution. Then,
• The seller with the optimal reserve price holds the auction later (sooner) than the social planner with an efficient auction, if λ(v)v is increasing (decreasing).
• The seller with zero reserve price holds the auction later (sooner) than the social planner, if λ(v)v is increasing (decreasing).
• The seller with the optimal reserve price holds the auction earlier than the seller with zero reserve price.
• Suppose that the seller is forced to use an efficient auction. Consider two type distributions F and H, where F is more right-skewed than H. Then, the seller facing F holds the auction later than the seller facing H.
• Suppose that the seller is free to choose any auction format. Then, seller facing F holds the auction later than the seller facing
Proof. We show that the argument in Lemma 2 applies with this particular structure on {N (t), t ≥ 0}. From the expression for the optimal stopping time in (4), we can see that designer A waits for a larger number of bidders than designer B if
S B (n) for all n, because any n that satisfies the inequality in the infimum for n * A will satisfy the inequality defining n * B . Hence, the designer facing a more right-skewed type distribution will stop later. The same argument as in Theorem 1, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2 establishes the result.
Remark 6 (Strategic Arrivals and Departures). So far, we have assumed that the arrival-departure process N (·) is exogenously given. However, this assumption might not always be innocuous. For instance, a sophisticated bidder in the corporate takeover auction may pretend that getting financial backing for a bid takes longer than is actually necessary, if it thinks that by delaying it can place the seller in a disadvantageous bargaining position. In fact, whether or not dynamic mechanisms are manipulable by strategic arrivals or departures has been a major focus of the literature on dynamic mechanism design. 16 For example, if later arrivals make the seller pessimistic about future arrivals, a late arrival by bidder i could lead the seller to "despair" and hold the auction sooner and possibly with fewer bidders than if bidder i had arrived earlier. Knowing this, if i's arrival time is not common knowledge, he could strategically delay his arrival (Gershkov et al., 2015) .
Given the optimal auction timing of our model, will bidder i have strategic incentives to arrive later than a i or depart earlier than a i + D i ? We show that, under the optimal stopping time identified in Theorem 2, bidders will in fact want to show up (and depart) truthfully. Whenever bidder i strategically times his arrival and/or departure, the number of bidders N (t) observed by the designer is different from the actual process N (t). However, no matter what the deviation is, N (t) ≤ N (t) always holds. In particular, N (t) never hits n * strictly earlier than N (t). Thus, bidder i either (i) misses the opportunity to participate in the auction and obtains a payoff of zero, or (ii) joins an n * -bidder auction that will be held later than if he would have if he had i truthfully reported his arrival and departure times. Bidder i does not benefit from the deviation in (i), because the payoff from the auction is non-negative. Nor does he benefit in the case (ii), because he must incur the cost of additional discounting without changing the number of opposing bidders he faces in the auction. Therefore, the cut-off policy in Theorem 2 is robust to bidders' strategic incentive to "misreport" the timing of their arrival and departure.
Impossibility of α-approximation
In the spirit of a large literature on approximation in mechanism design, one might hope that the seller could do reasonably well by restricting herself to simpler mechanisms. 17 In particular, following common practice in, say, real estate auctions, one could conjecture that holding the auction at a given date, fixed in advance, would perform well across a range of environments. Alas, the following result shows that the relative loss to the seller from restricting herself to holding the auction at a fixed date (even if the date is set optimally in advance, with full knowledge of the environment) is unbounded. In other words, no α-approximation of optimal revenue is possible: in an uncertain environment, the seller may obtain an arbitrarily small fraction of the revenue from the fully optimal policy.
The formal analysis proceeds as follows. First, we restrict the class of the auction timing problems. Namely, we consider any revenue-maximization problem such that the bidders arrive according to a renewal process with the inter-arrival distribution G, and there is no departure (see Section 5 for the definition of a renewal process). Thus, any auction timing problem we consider is described by a triplet (r, F, G) of the discount factor r, the valuation distribution F , and the inter-arrival distribution G. Now, given (r, F, G), let OP T (r, F, G) be the ex-ante expected revenue from the optimal timing and auction format policy. Also, let DET (r, F, G) be the maximum expected revenue when the seller is restricted to use a deterministic auction timing. That is, DET (r, F, G) is the maximized value of the problem max t∈R + e −rt E[R(N (t))]. The following result states that, without further restriction on the class of auction timing problems, focusing only on the deterministic stopping rules can perform arbitrarily worse than the optimal history-contingent policy:.
where F is the set of regular distributions, and G is the set of probability distributions supported on R ++ .
The proof, which is relegated to Appendix D, proceeds by explicitly constructing a sequence of examples that attains the infimum. G is supported on a finite grid of points, and along the sequence, all mass is moving to the right end of the grid. If we take a nearly degenerate valuation distribution (so that profits from an auction do not really increase by adding additional bidders beyond the first one), we can then choose grid points so that along the sequence, the optimal deterministic deadline is always to plan on holding the auction at the first time grid point, whereas the fully optimal policy is to wait for the first arrival. Therefore, as we move along the sequence, the best deterministic policy leaves the good unsold with probability approaching one, and achieves a payoff approaching zero. Meanwhile, the optimal "flexible" policy makes sure the good is sold by always waiting for the first bidder, guaranteeing a payoff that is always positive, but far in the future and shrinking along the sequence.
As we can see in the proof, along the sequence {(F n , G n )} ∞ n=1 , both DET (r, F n , G n ) and OP T (r, F n , G n ) converge to zero: that is, by using a fixed deadline, the seller ends up capturing only a vanishing fraction of a vanishing quantity. However, this does not mean that the seller's loss is necessarily small in absolute terms, because for each fixed n, scaling up v would make OP T − DET arbitrarily large. Given that we can vary the loss in absolute terms by manipulating F , Theorem 4 should not be read as a quantitative statement about the size of losses incurred by deterministic deadlines. Rather, we interpret the result in two ways: unless we restrict the primitives of the timing problem, (i) deterministic deadlines are not an appropriate subclass of stopping times to focus on; and (ii), the gain to the seller from having access and reacting to the history of arrivals can be arbitrarily large.
Our particular construction might give the impression that deterministic timing performs worse if inter-arrival times are more dispersed. This intuition is incorrect, and we can find examples in which a deadline "approximates" the optimal stopping policy even in the limit as G n becomes arbitrarily dispersed. For example, if we restrict G to the collection of the uniform distributions U [0,T ], then given a nearly degenerate F , we obtain DET OP T = 1/2 asT → ∞. Analogously, taking G to be the collection of all exponential distributions leads to an approximation ratio of e −1 . Thus, dispersion is not the only source of our impossibility result. We speculate that, in addition to dispersion, extreme skewness in inter-arrival times is essential for fixed deadlines to perform poorly. We provide some confirmation of this fact in the next subsection: if random discounts have sufficiently thin right tails, then optimal deadlines provide a constant approximation of the best case revenue.
A Partial Approximation Result
Under strong assumptions on the nature of arrivals and the form of the optimal rule, we can obtain an 1/e approximation:
Proposition 3. Fix any r > 0. Let G DIHR+ be the class of inter-arrival time distributions such that (i) for each n ∈ N, the random discount e −r(T 1 +···+Tn) until n bidders is IHR, and (ii) there exists n * ∈ N such that the fully optimal auction timing is to wait until n * -th bidder arrives. Let F be the set of regular valuation distributions (not necessarily deterministic). Then
At first glance, condition (ii) might seem like an assumption on the valuation distribution F . However, by Fact 1, the qualitative properties of terminal payoffs R(n) are essentially identical for any regular F , so in the end the qualitative form of the stopping rule depends on the nature of the arrival process. For example, if G is "New Better than Used" Zuckerman (1984) (T − s|T ≥ s ≥ F OSD T ), a generalization of IHR, then an argument similar to the one in Theorem 2 shows that, for any F , the optimal rule stops at some n * ∈ N (the specific value of n * may depend on parameters like r and F ).
The proof, in Appendix D, uses an analogy between our timing problem and the static problem of calculating the worst-case ratio of expected profit from an optimal posted price to expected welfare in an IPV model. Lemma 3.10 in Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) provides a lower bound of this latter quantity, which we can translate into the current problem.
Conclusion
We have studied the question of when to hold an auction in a setting where bidders arrive and depart stochastically over time. We show that, for a very general class of arrival and departure processes, a social planner holds an auction later as the distribution of bidder values becomes more right-skewed. As a consequence, we also prove that sellers usually hold auctions inefficiently late, since the distribution of marginal revenues (censored at 0) is usually more right-skewed than the distribution of valuations. We identify a key condition on the distribution of bidder values that determines whether censored marginal revenues are more or less right-skewed than valuations: sellers wait too long if the distribution's price elasticity of demand is increasing, and too little if it is decreasing. Moreover, we decompose the welfare losses from revenue maximization into an information rent effect (conditional on using the same selling mechanism, the seller values stopping at each state according to virtual values as opposed to true values) and an auction format effect (the seller wants to use an inefficient selling mechanism upon stopping, but this feeds back into the decision about when to stop). The former leads the seller to hold the auction earlier or later depending on whether the elasticity of demand with respect to price is decreasing or increasing, while the latter always leads the seller to hold the auction earlier. Consequently, we show that even though the two effects can move the optimal timing in opposite directions, whenever we can unambiguously sign the information rent effect, it dominates. Finally, we prove that a fixed deadline, even an optimal one, cannot approximate the performance of the optimal stopping rule without strong restrictions on the arrival process. This suggests that the potential benefit from adopting a history-dependent timing rule may be substantial.
We conclude by highlighting some questions for future research. First, it would be useful to better understand what features of an arrival process make simple deadlines perform well compared to the optimal adaptive policy. What exactly are the elements of G DIHR+ , and is there a natural sufficient condition that implies membership in this class?
Second, and more importantly, our discussion of the robustness of simple rules has been somewhat limited, since the rules we consider, while "simple", still depend on a lot of fine-grained knowledge about the environment. A key question would be whether one can design prior-free dynamic mechanisms with good guarantees, i.e., mechanisms whose very description does not depend on the prior distributions of values and arrival times. In a static environment, ? show that a simple second price auction with no reserve price gathers at least as much revenue as the optimal prior-dependent mechanism with one fewer bidder, a result that effectively puts an upper bound on the usefulness of information about the prior. Can we find guarantees like these for auction timing problems, or more generally for dynamic mechanism design with arriving agents?
Extending these results to dynamic environments is not merely a technical exercise, since the usual arguments for robust "detail-free" guarantees are far more pressing in dynamic mechanism design. For example, a common motivation for using prior-free mechanisms is that the data needed to estimate those prior beliefs can be hard to come by or entirely unavailable in markets for new goods. But data to estimate the distribution of valuations are generally far more readily available than data to estimate the dynamic process of arrivals. It is hard for firms to know how long they should wait for bidders to show up unless they have already been searching a long time. Under symmetric, increasing equilibria, commonly used mechanisms such as first and second price auctions produce abundant information about the type distribution, which can then be used to calibrate an optimal static mechanism. In the IPV environment, a single second price auction with n bidders generates n independent data points drawn from the distribution of bidder values. In contrast, many timing rules used in practice generate data about the underlying dynamic process very slowly if at all. For instance, holding an auction at a fixed later deadline T , which is the usual practice in real estate auctions, would only generate a single draw of N (T ). One therefore needs several auctions with deadline T just to obtain a sample from the distribution of bidder numbers at T , and several auctions for each choice of T in order to estimate the whole arrival process {N (t), t ≥ 0}.
In fact, prior-free robustness results in our auction timing framework would be helpful in a broad range of stopping problems in economics. Consider, for instance, job search models generalizing the dynamic structure of Mortensen (1986) ; the optimal stopping rules in these models are often straightforward reservation wage policies (see Zuckerman (1984 Zuckerman ( , 1986 Zuckerman ( , 1988 ), but the thresholds depend on fine features of the distributions of wage offers and arrival times between offers that a) would be difficult for agents to verify from limited data, and b) could in fact be violated in general equilibrium. Can workers, say, devise robust search rules that have good guarantees and do not depend on aspects of the environment that might be hard for them to verify? is increasing, so M R(v (n:n) ) = X (n:n) . Also, letX be an additional draw of marginal revenue that is independent from the original sample X 1 , . . . , X n . Define the function g p (x) = E[max{X, x, p}], which is non-negative for any p ∈ R ∪ {∞}. For n ≥ 2 bidders, We can re-write expected marginal revenue, censored at p, as E E max{X (n−1:n−1) ,X, p}) = E E max{X (n−1:n−1) , x, p}|X = x = E[g p (X (n−1:n−1) )] (7) Since g p is increasing for all p ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, for any n ≥ 2, the seller who uses an optimal auction has the same payoffs as a social planner facing a distribution of types Y i ∼ g 0 (X i ), while the seller who uses a second price auction with no reserve has the same payoffs as a social planner facing a distribution of types
is increasing, so g p (X i ) is more right-skewed than g p (X i ), and in particular, for n ≥ 2 the seller faces a more right-skewed distribution of payoffs under the optimal auction than under a second price auction with no reserve price. 19 Therefore, by Lemma 2 the seller stops earlier when she can use an optimal auction. Next, suppose that λ(v)v is decreasing. By the symmetric argument, the planner stops later than the seller if λ(v)v is decreasing.
Finally, to prove that the optimal auction coincides with the efficient auction, we show that
if v > v. This contradicts the regularity of F .
Appendix B: Implementability under Unobservable Arrival and Departure
Whether or not dynamic mechanisms are manipulable by strategic arrivals or departures has been a major focus of the literature on dynamic mechanism design. 20 We have discussed above why the timing policy we derive is robust to the strategic arrivals, but our arguments used specific features of the optimal policy, which we only knew ex post. In many cases, however, the explicit form of the optimal or efficient policy is unknown (e.g., it can be computed numerically, or only qualitative features are known without further assumptions), but one still needs to determine whether the policy is vulnerable to manipulation by strategic arrivals. This raises the question: are there general features of the environment such that the optimal policy under observable arrivals is always implementable? We give a partial answer here that nonetheless covers a broad range of problems: in the pure arrivals case, bidders will want to report arrival times truthfully under the designer's optimal stopping time for any renewal process {N (t)} t≥0 . The proof strategy, based on similar arguments in Gershkov et al. (2015) , extends the logic used in Remark 6.
19 Indeed,
is increasing on (−∞, p ), because only g p (x) increases in this region. Also, on (p , +∞),
is equal to 1, so it is trivially increasing.
20 For example, see Pai and Vohra (2013) , Gershkov et al. (2014) and Gershkov et al. (2015) .
Theorem 5. Suppose that there are no departures, and the arrival process is a renewal process. Then the optimal auction timing under observable arrivals is implementable under unobservable arrivals.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof strategy is similar to Proposition 3 in Gershkov et al. (2014) . Without loss of generality, the seller can look at Markov policies, i.e., policies that at each time T condition only on the number of bidders N (T ) and the time since the latest arrival, L(T ). Consider a bidder i with true type (v i , a i ) = (v, t) who won the auction at time T * by reporting value v and arrival time t > t. By discounting, we know that the time T * at which the auction is held satisfies
where V (·, ·) is the value from continued search at the given Markov state. For any value of N (T * ), L(T * ) is therefore a pool-size-specific critical waiting period, such that whenever there are N (T * ) bidders in the pool for a period L(T * ) with no other arrivals, an auction is triggered. We claim that bidder i would also win the auction, at a time T * or sooner and with weakly lower expected payment, by reporting (v , t ) with t ∈ [t, t ). Note first that the new report cannot possibly delay the auction past T * . The new arrival time t will trigger an auction after a new critical waiting period corresponding to a pool size that might differ from N (T * ). But if the new auction time corresponding to the (possibly new) pool size were later than T * , the auction would be triggered at T * once again: since i's new arrival time is at most t ≤ T − L(T * ), there would be N (T * ) bidders in the pool for a waiting time of L(T * ). Hence, the new report could either (i) trigger the auction after a new critical waiting period for a strictly lower pool size n < N (T * ) elapses; (ii) trigger an auction after the same critical wait period L(T * ) for pool size N (T * ) elapses, but starting at a possibly different time; or (iii), not change outcomes. i is strictly better off in case (i), since her expected payments are smaller and the auction happens weakly earlier than before the deviation. Similarly, in case (ii), the auction must be happening strictly earlier than before; expected payments are unchanged, but by discounting, i is strictly better off.
Proof. For the first condition, by Corollary 1 in Scarsini (1988) , under independent components, component-wise dominance (X ≥ F OSD X and Y ≥ F OSD Y ) implies vector-wise stochastic dominance: P(X ∈ A) ≥ P(X ∈ A) for every increasing set A in the Borel σ-algebra on R 2 . By a result of Lehmann (1955, p. 400) , the latter is equivalent to
For the second condition, since X, Y are independent, it is well known that E[g(X, Y )|Y ] = f (Y ) where f (y) = E[g(X, y)] (e.g., Corollary 4.38 in Breiman, 1992) . Define similarly f (y) = E[g(X , y)]. Then, since X ≥ F OSD X and g is increasing in the first argument, for all y in the support of Y , f (y) ≥ f (y). Therefore, E[g(X, Y )|Y ] ≥ E[g(X , Y )|Y ] with probability one, and the result follows by iterated expectations (since Y ∼ Y ).
Proof. The first statement follows trivially by independence of W and D. To prove the second statement, take A, B, C and E to be any Borel sets. Let G be the σ-algebra generated by the sets {W ∈ C, D ∈ E} and H be that generated by the sets {D ∈ E}. Then write P(W ∈ A, D ∈ B|G) as
where σ(·) is the σ-algebra generated by a collection (and σ(W ) is that generated by the inverse images of W ). The first equality is just iterated expectations, and the second follows from W being σ(G, σ(W ))-measurable. By the independence of W and D, P(D ∈ B|σ(G, σ(W ))) is simply P(D ∈ B|D ∈ E), which again by independence equals P(D ∈ B|G). Therefore, the inner expectation is G-measurable, and the last line of the above display can be written as
Since {W ∧ D ≥ ∆} = {W ≥ ∆, D ≥ ∆}, it has product structure, and the result follows.
Lemmas 4 and 5 have the following key corollary:
Corollary 1. Assume W is has the increasing hazard rate and W ⊥ D as before. Let g : R 2 → R be any Borel-measurable, integrable function that is increasing in the first argument. If D is exponential, then for any
Proof. By the first part of Lemma 5,
The result then follows by Lemma 4.
We are now ready for the key result in this section.
Lemma 6. Suppose that inter-arrival times W have the increasing hazard rate, and sojourn times D are iid exponential. Then for any n, V (n, ·) is non-decreasing.
Proof. We take any a, b ∈ R + such that a > b, and fix them throughout the proof. For any ∆ ≥ 0, we define
We proceed by induction on n. First,
Second, suppose that V (k, ·) is non-decreasing for k = 0, . . . , n − 1. Let h n,a denote a sample path which starts from (n, a). Namely, h n,a is an element of (Z×R + ) R + where h n,a (x) is a number of bidders and time since last arrival at calendar time t + x. Since h n,a is a sample path starting from (n, a), h n,a (0) = (n, a).
Let T be the set of stopping times adapted to the filtration generated by number of bidders and time since last arrival, and E n,a denote the expectation with respect to the measure that substitutes W, D|W ∧ D ≥ a as the distribution for initial arrival and departure times. For any ∆ ∈ R ∪ {∞}, V (n, a) can be written as
=E n,a [e −rτ * V (n τ * , a τ * )]
Now, let τ * a be a solution of (8), and define ∆ a ∈ R + ∪ {∞} as
where h n,a 0 is the sample path in which no arrivals or departures take place after time t. In other words, h n,a 0 (x) = (n, a + x) for all x ≥ 0. Because τ * a has to be adapted, for any sample path h n,a with no arrivals or departures in [t, t + ∆ a ], (i.e. h n,a (y) = (n, a + y) for any y ≤ ∆ a ,) τ * (h n,a ) = ∆ a must hold. Thus, on the event {W 1 ∧ D (n) ≥ ∆ a }, the seller stops at t + ∆ a , and V (n τ * a , a τ * a ) = R(n). Likewise, defining D (n) = max {D 1 , . . . , D n }, it holds that V (n τ * a , a τ * a ) = V (n + 1, 0) and V (n τ * a , a τ * a ) = V (n−1, a+D (n) ) on the events {W < D (n) ∧∆ a } and {D (n) < W ∧∆ a }, respectively. Therefore, evaluating (9) at ∆ = ∆ a , we obtain V (n, a) = E[e −r∆a 1 Wa∧D (n) ≥∆a ]R(n) + E e −rWa 1 Wa<D (n) ∧∆a V (n + 1, 0)
Defining ∆ b analogously to ∆ a , we also have
Note that by Lemma 5 and the memoryless property of the exponential distribution, the variable [D (n) − ∆ a |W 1 ∧ ∆ (n) ≥ ∆ a ] is independent of W a or W b , and has the same law as D (n) . Now, by the inductive hypothesis, V (n − 1, a + D (n) ) ≥ V (n − 1, b + D (n) ) for any realization of D (n) . Replacing ∆ a and V (n − 1, a + D (n) ) by ∆ b and V (n − 1, b + D (n) ) respectively in (11), we obtain
Hence it is enough to show that V (n, b) ≤ RHS of (12) 
Note that E[Φ(W a , D (n) )] is equal to (13). Therefore, V (n, a) ≥ V (n, b), which completes the induction.
Next, we prove two lemmas that enable the simple one-step characterization of n * . Define β(j) = E[e −rτ (j−1,j) ], where τ (j − 1, j) is the random time elapsed between when the pool size first reaches j − 1 to when it first reaches j. Then, we can write the first hitting times τ n = inf{t : N (t) = n} as n j=1 τ (j − 1, j). Lemma 7. The seller's expected revenue at time 0 from holding the auction upon the n-th bidder's arrival is given by n j=1 β(j)R(n). Proof. The expected revenue from stopping at the n-th bidder's arrival is E[e −rτn ]R(n) = E[e −r n j=1 τ (j−1,j) ]R(n).
Let F τn be the stopped sigma algebra corresponding to the first time that the bidder pool reaches size n. Then P(τ (j − 1, j) ≤ t|F τ j−1 ) = P(τ (j − 1, j) ≤ t|D i ≥ τ (j − 2, j − 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1)
since τ (j − 1, j) is measurable with respect to (i) inter-arrival times are independent of F τ j−1 , (ii) sojourn times from bidders that arrive after τ j−1 (and thus are independent of F τ j−1 ), and (iii) sojourn times from bidders still in the pool at τ j−1 . The first two sets of variables are independent of {D i ≥ τ (j − 2, j − 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1} by assumption. By the memoryless property of the exponential distribution, the third set has the same distribution with and without conditioning. Thus, the above display is just P(τ (j − 1, j) ≤ t), and the {τ (i − 1, i)} i∈N "first-increment" times are pairwise independent. Therefore, E[e −r n j=1 τ (j−1,j) ] = n j=1 β(j), as required.
By Lemma 7, the seller's expected revenue from the optimal policy must equal n * j=1 β(j) R(n * ). Next, we provide a technical lemma useful to establish the one-step characterization. Intuitively, the lemma shows that, the larger the current pool size is, the longer it takes to reach an additional record. before or after. Let DET aux and OP T aux denote the best ex ante payoffs from only deadlines and from any policy in this auxiliary single-bidder problem. If the seller in the auxiliary problem can use any stopping time, she stops atT and posts a price equal to R(n * ). This gives her an ex-ante payoff of OP T aux = E[e −rT ]R(n * ), which matches OP T from the original many-bidder problem by our assumption on the optimal policy. Now consider also a static monopoly pricing problem where with bidder valuation given by v = e −rT . Given a price p ∈ (0, 1], the probability of acceptance is 1 − H(p) = P(v ≥ p) = P(T ≤ −r −1 log p) = G(−r −1 log p). Note that for any CDF G, H(x) = 1 − G(−r −1 log x) is a well-defined CDF. In this notation, DET aux = max t≥0 e −rt G(t) = max p≥0 p(1 − H(p)), which equals the expected profits from a posted price p in the static pricing problem, while OP T aux = E G [e is the ratio of expected profits to total welfare in a static pricing problem.
From Lemma 3.10 in Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) (using t = 0 in their notation) we have that for any IHR H, a static pricing problem satisfies
. G ∈ G DIHR+ by assumption, so e −rT will satisfy IHR. Hence, by (19),
e . By the definition of n * , OP T aux matches OP T in the original problem, while DET aux is a crude lower bound for DET . Indeed, DET aux = e −rt P(T ≤ t)R(n * ) is a lower bound for DET on the event {T < t} (since there could be more than n * bidders in that case), and the contribution to DET from the event {T < t} is positive. Therefore DET ≥ DET aux ≥ 1 e OP T aux = 1 e OP T , as required.
The result extends to R(n, 0) and R(n, p * ) in the regular case by substituting (possibly ironed) marginal revenues M R(v j ) or M R(v j ) ∨ 0, respectively, for v j . 24 To show Point 3, note that diminishing returns of n → R(n) imply R(n + 2) 1 − R(n + 1) R(n + 2) ≤ R(n + 1) 1 − R(n) R(n + 1)
By revenue monotonicity, the terms in the parentheses are non-negative, so for (21) to hold even though R(n + 2) ≥ R(n + 1),
